Abstract. We examine contracts used in the North American sugarbeet industry. Though quite similar in many respects, the contracts we study vary across processing firms in the set of quality measures used to condition contract payments to growers. This is somewhat surprising given the homogeneous nature of the processors' finished product (refined sugar). It seems unlikely that processors differ significantly in how they value the various attributes of a sugarbeet, and this is perhaps the most natural reason to expect differences in the structure of quality incentives across processors. Previous attempts to explain the observed variation in sugarbeet contracts have focused on differences in organizational form across firms.
Introduction
Contract designs differ substantially across agricultural commodity sectors where growers and intermediaries coordinate their activities contractually. Among the design features that may or may not be observed in any given commodity include third party quality measurement, relative performance evaluation (e.g., tournaments), multi-year commitments, and direct intermediary involvement in farm-level decision making. It is perhaps natural to expect this kind of variation across commodity sectors. Differences in the nature of the final output, in the structure of the relevant production and processing technologies, and in institutional features of the relevant markets (e.g., farm policy), alter the coordination needs of contracting parties, and hence result in different contract designs. It is perhaps less natural to expect variation within commodity sectors, though even this is observed. One striking example occurs in North American sugarbeet markets. In these markets, contract payments to growers in one set of production regions depend only on measured sugar quantity, while in another set of production regions payment depends on both measured sugar quantity and quality (as represented by the degree of sugar "purity"). But there is very little product differentiation in the production and marketing of refined sugar, so this explanation seems unlikely. An alternative explanation is based on the observation that many of the firms that condition payment on quality happen to be cooperatives (Balbach 1998, Sykuta and Cook 2001) . It is argued that cooperative organizations are able to use such a contract, because grower and "firm" objectives are more closely aligned.
However, this does not account for the observation that there are also non-cooperative firms that condition payment on quality, and cooperative firms that do not.
In this paper, we argue that the observed variation in contract structure can arise quite naturally from differences across production regions in the nature of the tradeoff between sugar quantity and quality. Briefly, producing beets with a high degree of sugar purity (which is primarily achieved through reduced nitrogen use) comes at the cost of reduced beet yield. Because total refined sugar from an acre's production depends on sugar purity and yield, there is not an obviously "optimal" way to manage this tradeoff. For example, it may be efficient to produce relatively impure beets-an outcome that can be achieved by paying growers only on sugar quantity-if increasing purity results in very large yield reductions.
To make this argument precise, we develop a model of contract design that captures the essential features of the sugarbeet contracting environment, and show how the value of measuring sugar quality can be relatively low when the stochastic relationship between sugar quantity and quality is such that growers have little control over quality.
This corresponds to a situation where quality is not very "informative" in a sense we make clear below. Before presenting our model and results, we first describe sugarbeet contracts more fully, and document the type of variation in contract structure that is observed.
1 See Wu (2001) for an analysis along these lines in the context of processing tomato contracts.
Sugarbeet Contracts: Description
Sugarbeets are grown by eleven processors across six major production regions in the United States and Canada (Lilleboe 1999 (Lilleboe /2000 . All sugarbeet contracts between processors and growers use a measure of total estimated sugar quantity to adjust perton payments to growers.
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Five processors also adjust payments to growers with a measure of sugar quality. Although the total sugar content of a load of beets may be high, various impurities in the sugar can lead to low production of the final product (refined sugar), and "quality" is the estimated "extraction rate," or percentage of pure sugar, for a load of beets (Cooke and Scott 1993) . Total refined sugar production in a load can thus be estimated by multiplying its measured sugar content and extraction rate.
Contracts that condition grower payment only on sugar quantity are referred to by people in the sugarbeet industry as the "Western" contract, and, as its name suggests, are observed only in Western production regions. In this contract, processors compute an average annual price for refined sugar sales that is net of various marketing and handling costs, and then adjust this price based on the measured sugar content of growers' beets. Growers and processors thus share in the aggregate price risk associated with refined sugar, and there is no sense in which payments are adjusted for sugar purity.
There are two kinds of contracts that condition payment in some way on sugar purity. The first of these, referred to in the sugarbeet industry as the "Eastern" contract, does so indirectly by making the base payment to growers depend on the average annual price for the sale of all sugar products, including those derived from extracted impurities.
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Since the price for the primary sugar product is high relative to secondary products associated with sugar impurities, growers face some (though rather weak) incentive to deliver beets with a relatively high degree of sugar purity.
The base price is then adjusted for each load of beets according to measured sugar quantity in relation to the average measured sugar quantity across all loads delivered during the relevant crop year. The Eastern contract thus uses a form of relative performance evaluation that reduces aggregate production risk associated with producing beets with a high sugar content.
Finally, the so called "extractable sugar contract" directly adjusts grower payment according to measured quantity and quality (extraction rate), and is thus considerably more "high powered" than the Eastern contract with respect to incentives for delivering beets with a high degree of sugar purity. Given that total sugar production is the product of sugar content and the extraction rate, it is a bit surprising that this latter measure is not used by all processors. Intuitively, the extractable sugar contract seems more "efficient" in the sense that growers are given a more accurate signal concerning the relative value of alternative sugarbeet attributes. Balbach (1998) and Sykuta and Cook (2001) observe that the extractable sugar contract is used primarily by cooperative processors, and argue that these firms are able to use this more "efficient" contract because firm and grower objectives are more closely aligned, relative to private or investor-owned firms. However, as noted earlier, this observation is not universal.
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Moreover, there are reasons to doubt that the organizational structure of a firm should affect efficient contract design. There would have to be good reason to believe that the set of observable and contractible signals of performance differed across firm types. In the context of sugarbeet contracts, procedures used to measure the relevant quantity and quality signals are quite standard, and it is difficult to imagine reasons why a firm, regardless of its organizational structure, could not choose to contract on both measures, if doing so increased expected surplus.
In this paper, we argue that differences in contract structure can arise in response to variation in growing conditions across the various production regions. This argument is consistent with the observation that contract form varies across regions, and not across firms within a given region. Of course, given the limited number of observations on the various contract types, it is impossible at this point to statistically reject either hypothesis, though later in the paper we suggest ways in which appropriate data might be collected to carry out such a test.
In what follows, we develop a simple model that demonstrates how the nature of the stochastic relationship between farm-level inputs, and quantity and quality outcomes, influences the value of including different performance measures in a contract. In the case of sugarbeet production, nitrogen is the key input that affects realizations of both quantity and quality measures (Cattanach, Dahnke, and Fanning 1993; Cooke and Scott 1993) , and is apparently noncontractible.
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As indicated earlier, nitrogen applications tend to increase total sugar production, and reduce the degree of sugar purity. Conditioning payment on sugar purity is thus a means of addressing the perverse effect of nitrogen on total extractable sugar. The benefit of using quality incentives will therefore be largest in environments where this effect is most acute, and it is natural to expect the nature of this tradeoff to vary across production regions.
Imagine for example, that nitrogen applications increase sugar quantity substantially in some region, but have little impact on sugar purity. Intuitively, the benefits from conditioning payment on quality in this region will tend to be low, because there is not much need to moderate nitrogen use.
In the following section, we develop a formal model of sugarbeet contract design where the stochastic relationship between quantity and quality is explicitly related to the value of including these measures in the contract. Our model is somewhat novel in that it considers multiple performance measures that can enter grower compensation in any arbitrary (possibly nonlinear) fashion. This is important for the sugarbeet example, because actual contracts are in fact multiplicative in the observed performance measures. A standard linear contracts (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom (1994)) framework is thus both unsuitable and intractable.
Sugarbeet Contracts: Theory

Model Setup
We model sugarbeet contracting between a processor and a single grower, and for simplicity assume the contract governs exchange of a single acre's production. Realized production from this acre is represented by its estimated sugar content q ∈ Q ≡ {q 1 , . . . , q l }, and the estimated fraction of this sugar that is "recoverable",
We let s ≡ (r, q) denote the full vector of signals, and define S ≡ {(r, q)|r ∈ R, q ∈ Q} to be the set of all possible realizations of s. The notation s ≥ s has the usual componentwise meaning.
The grower conditions the joint distribution of s with the amount (measured in dollars per acre) of nitrogen a ∈ A ≡ {a 1 , . . . , a n } applied to his crops, 7 assumed noncontractible, and other production inputs that we suppress for notational simplicity.
The set A is ordered with a i > a j for i > j, and the probability of outcome s is 
Grower preferences may thus be multiplicatively or additively separable in compensation and action, but not necessarily so. In addition to making the grower risk averse, Assumption 1 rules out lotteries in the optimal contract (for details, see Assumption A1 in Grossman and Hart (1983) ).
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Because we interpret a as the dollar cost of nitrogen use, it is also natural to assume that for given w, utility is lower for higher a:
The processor is assumed risk neutral, with the value of an acre's production given by V (r, q), assumed increasing in both arguments.
Reservation utility for the grower is denoted by U . To induce participation by the grower, the processor must ensure that its contract offers an expected utility at least as large as U . Under full information, the processor can observe and verify the level of nitrogen applied by the grower. Let
represent the firstbest cost of getting the grower to choose action a. When action a is contractible, the processor can pay the grower C F B (a) if the grower chooses a, and otherwise impose a large penalty. From Assumption 2, it follows that
When a is noncontractible, the processor pays the grower conditional on the realization of s. Denote compensation given a particular outcome s by w(s), and let u(s) = U (w(s)). Grossman and Hart (1983) show that the processor's contract design problem can be solved in two stages. In the first stage, the processor chooses u(s) to minimize the cost of implementing a given action (subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints), and in the second stage chooses the action that yields the highest expected net benefit. The optimal compensation schedule is then computed as w(s) = U −1 (u(s)). Let C(a) denote the minimum cost of implementing action a. If for some a, there is no feasible solution, then we set C(a) = ∞;
such an a is not implementable. The optimal level of nitrogen use is the one that
Now suppose there is some strictly positive cost m that must be incurred to measure r. The benefit associated with this measurement is given by the expected increase in profits to the principal from conditioning w on s, relative to a contract that is conditioned only on q. Define V q as the maximum net benefit to the principal from a contract conditioned only on q. Then it is optimal to condition compensation on s
Based on the discussion in our introduction, we would like to evaluate how a change in the structure of π(s|a) affects the (expected) value of measuring r, given by ∆.
To do this, we impose a structure on π(s|a) that is intended to capture the essential features of the tradeoff between quantity and quality inherent in sugarbeet production.
Sugarbeet Technology
We consider the simplest possible environment where there is a meaningful tradeoff between quantity and quality, and where choosing a "moderate" level of nitrogen use may be efficient. There are two possible outcomes for each signal, and the grower selects from three possible levels of nitrogen use. Let q L and q H , with q L < q H , and r L and r H , with r L < r H denote the possible values of quantity and recoverable sugar, respectively. Then, the full vector of signals s ≡ (r, q) has four possible real-
processor's payoff is an increasing function of yield and recoverable sugar, so we have
For simplicity, we further assume that v i = v j for i = j. Then, since the processor's payoffs are distinct under all four realizations of the signal s, the ability of the two parties to contract on s is equivalent to contracting on the realization of v.
The grower has a choice over three levels of nitrogen, A ≡ {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }, where a 1 < a 2 < a 3 . The probability distribution over the v i 's induced by action a i is given in Table 1 . We assume that a 1 is some arbitrarily "bad" action that induces a high probability of q L and r L , relative to actions a 2 and a 3 . We include this action to ensure that the optimal contract is never a fixed payment. We also assume l i > 0 and i l i = 1, and similarly for p i . We further suppose that δ 1 < p 1 , δ 3 < p 3 , δ 1 + δ 3 > 0, and p 2 − 1 < δ 2 < −δ 1 (note that the last of these sets of inequalities implies δ 1 + δ 2 < 0).
Under these assumptions, when the grower switches from action a 2 (the "moderate" action) to action a 3 , the probability of high q increases by δ 1 + δ 3 , and the probability of high recoverable sugar falls by δ 1 + δ 2 . Parameter δ 1 governs the affect of action a 3 on the probability of simultaneously observing either the high or low state for both performance measures. Similarly, parameters δ 2 and δ 3 govern the affect of action a 3 on the probability of high r and q, respectively.
Let B(a i ) = j π(v j |a i )v j denote the expected benefit to the processor if the grower picks action a i . When δ 1 + δ 3 is relatively large, and the absolute value of δ 1 + δ 2 is relatively small, choosing action a 3 (increasing nitrogen use) instead of action a 2 , raises expected output substantially, without significantly reducing expected quality.
This will tend to make a 3 a preferred action, relative to a 2 . Intuitively, the value of using two signals is largest when action a 2 is preferred (i.e., when it is important to provide incentive for moderating nitrogen use). Thus, we expect that the value of measuring quality will be relatively low for a technology with large δ 1 + δ 3 and small absolute value of δ 1 + δ 2 . To evaluate this intuition more carefully, we need to consider the effect of measuring r on expected net benefits. We do this in the next section.
Contract Design
Two Signals. We start by supposing the two parties contract on both signals of the grower's action. The processor faces three constraints for implementing action a 2 .
First, the grower must be offered a contract that generates an expected utility at least as large as his reservation utility U :
Next, given the contract offered by the processor, choosing action a 2 must yield the grower at least as much expected utility as choosing action a 1 , and similarly for action a 2 with respect to action a 3 :
where
The cost of implementing action a 2 is then given by
Similarly, to implement action a 3 the processor faces the constraints
and the cost of implementing a 3 is given by
. We assume that both actions are implementable (C s (a 2 ) < ∞ and C s (a 3 ) < ∞), and that for both cost minimization problems, the equilibrium u i satisfy u 4 ≥ max{u 1 , u 2 , u 3 }. This (relatively weak) form of monotonicity allows us to analytically derive a number of useful comparative static results.
Without further parameterizing our model, we cannot determine which action maximizes the net benefit to the principal. However, we can determine how changes in the parameters δ 1 , δ 2 , and δ 3 affect the second-best action. Similar to the two-stage algorithm used for characterizing the optimal contract, we perform comparative statics by separately considering the effect of parameters on the expected payoff to the principal B(a) and the cost C(a) of implementing a given action. For example, if changing a parameter positively affects the net payoff B(a) − C(a) for action a, while the net payoff for other actions decrease or remain unchanged, then we can say that such a change may make a second-best, when previously it was not.
Consider first an increase in parameter δ 1 , which corresponds to a reduction in the probability of simultaneously observing both low r and low q, and a corresponding increase in the probability of simultaneously observing both high r and high q. The benefit B(a 2 ) is unaffected by such an increase, while C s (a 2 ) is nondecreasing. This is easily verified by observing that an increase in δ 1 results in a smaller constraint set for the processor's cost minimization problem with respect to action a 2 (the righthand-side of the inequality in (3) increases). Thus, the net payoff B(a 2 ) − C s (a 2 ) decreases as a result of an increase in δ 1 . Analogously, it is straightforward to verify that an increase in δ 1 leads to an increase in the net payoff B(a 3 ) − C s (a 3 ). Thus, as δ 1 increases, the expected net benefit from action a 3 relative to action a 2 also increases (the difference between B(a 3 ) − C s (a 3 ) and B(a 2 ) − C s (a 2 ) increases). For δ 1 sufficiently large, a 3 will be the efficient action. Similar reasoning can be employed to show that increases in δ 2 and δ 3 also increase the expected net benefit of action a 3 relative to action a 2 .
Intuitively, an increase in each δ i raises the expected benefit of choosing a 3 over a 2 because the probability of the best possible outcome (r H , q H ) increases. The cost of implementing action a 2 also goes up: the grower receives the highest possible payment when (r H , q H ) is realized, and because choosing action a 3 increases this probability by a larger amount when δ i increases, it becomes more difficult to implement action a 2 .
One Signal. Now we consider the scenario where the two parties contract only on q.
There are two possible outcome states, q L and q H , on which compensation can be conditioned. We denote compensation when q L (resp. q H ) is realized by u L (resp. u H ), and note that Pr[q L |a 3 ] = p 1 + p 3 − δ 1 − δ 3 , and Pr[q H |a 3 ] = p 2 + p 4 + δ 1 + δ 3 . To implement action a 2 , the following participation and incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied:
The minimum cost of implementing action a 2 with a contract conditioned only on q is then given by
Similarly, to implement action a 3 , the processor must satisfy
and the minimum cost of implementing action a 3 with a contract conditioned only on q is (11), (12)}.
As in the previous subsection, we consider how parameters δ i affect the optimal second-best action. Since δ 2 does not enter any constraint, it only affects the processor's objective function. An increase in δ 2 therefore increases the expected net benefit of action a 3 , relative to a 2 . Intuitively, δ 2 does not affect the probability of high q under action a 3 , but does make the outcome (r H , q H ) more likely, relative to (r L , q H ).
Thus, for a given contract, the grower's incentive to choose a 3 over a 2 remains unchanged, while expected benefits to the principal go up. It is also not difficult to show that an increase in either δ 1 or δ 3 leads to an increase in the difference between B(a 3 ) − C q (a 3 ) and B(a 2 ) − C q (a 2 ). An increase in either of these parameters lowers the cost of implementing action a 3 relative to action a 2 , and increases the expected net benefit under action a 3 .
Comparative Static Results
The comparative static results from the previous two subsections are summarized in Table 2 . either a 2 is the equilibrium action under both types of contracts, or the equilibrium action is a 3 . In the second scenario, a 2 is second-best when contracting on s, but a 3 is second-best when contracting only on q.
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Suppose first that the second-best action is the same under each information regime.
In this case, changes in ∆ are due entirely to differences in implementation costs. From Table 2 , increases in δ 1 and δ 3 change net benefits in the same direction under both information regimes, and thus have an ambiguous effect on ∆. When δ 2 increases, the net benefit of implementing action a 2 decreases under the two-signal contract, and remains unchanged under the one-signal contract. When a 3 is second best, increasing δ 2 raises net benefits under both information regimes, but by a smaller amount for the two signal contract.
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Thus, when a 2 (resp. a 3 ) is second-best, increasing δ 2 unambiguously reduces (resp. increases) ∆. We summarize the comparative static effects of δ 2 (which is the only parameter that yields unambiguous results for this scenario) on the expected value of quality measurement ∆ in the following result:
Result 1. If action a 2 (resp. a 3 ) is second-best under both information regimes, then increasing δ 2 reduces (resp. increases) the expected benefit from quality measurement.
Heuristically, when the equilibrium action is a 2 , the benefit from quality measurement comes from the processor's ability to distinguish between (r L , q H ) and (r H , q H ). Increases in δ i make a 3 a "better" action through two channels. First, expected benefits increase under a 3 because expected quantity goes up and expected reductions in quality go down. Second, the cost of implementing action a 3 relative to action a 2 goes down: the grower has greater incentive to choose a 3 , because doing so increases the probability of receiving the highest possible payment. Because, the primary benefit from quality measurement comes from being able to implement a 2 at lower cost, the expected value of quality measurement falls.
Thus, there are two different scenarios to consider when trying to answer the question, how do changes in the nature of the stochastic relationship between quantity and quality outcomes affect the expected benefits of quality measurement? The scenarios are defined by which set of actions are second-best under each regime. When the actions implemented under the two information regimes are the same, it is generally difficult to determine how changes in the δ i influence the expected value of quality measurement. However, increasing the probability of r H , while holding the total probability of q H constant (i.e., increasing δ 2 ) has an unambiguous affect, which differs depending which of the two actions is second best.
(action a 2 implemented when contracting on s, and action a 3 implemented when contracting only on q), improvements in the productivity of action a 3 (increasing the δ i 's) unambiguously reduce the value of quality measurement. Taken together, Results 1 and 2 are consistent with the intuition outlined in our introduction that the benefit of measuring and contracting on quality is relatively large when doing so moderates nitrogen use, relative to a contract where quality is not measured. This is because the additional signal r provides a means of rewarding high purity, even as q may fall, and this is the outcome that is achieved with moderate nitrogen use.
As noted in our introduction, processors are universally concerned with growers' fertility practices, and in particular with avoiding excessive nitrogen applications.
Contract incentives are used to moderate applications, and encourage relatively highpurity outcomes. Result 2 thus seems like the empirically relevant scenario. However, regardless of which result is the empirically relevant one, we have demonstrated that the value of quality measurement can differ across production regions if there is variation in the nature of the tradeoff between sugar quantity and quality. In the next section we evaluate our comparative statics computationally. In addition to confirming the analytic comparative static results discussed in this section, computation allows to get some sense for the potential magnitude of the benefit from quality measurement.
Computations
We suppose that the processor values total sugar production (r, q) according to .5, .3, .15, .05 ) and p = (.2, .3, .3, . 2), where
) denotes the vector of outcome probabilities conditioned on action a 1 , and similarly for p. w q and w s ), represent second-best actions (resp. compensation schedules) when only q is contractible and when s is contractible. .15 .4 .3 .151 .31,.88 .35,.59,.66,.69 -.175 .4 .3 .175 .31,.88 .35,.59,.66,.69 -.20 .2 .3 .179 .48,.48 .35,.59,.66,.69 .15 .4 .4 .006 .35,.75 .32,.72,.54,.74 -.175 .4 .3 .019 .35,.75 .35,.59,.66,.70 -.20 .4 .3 .040 .35,.75 .35,.59,.66,.70 The first three rows of Table 3 correspond to changes in δ 2 for relatively low values of δ 1 and δ 3 . Because a = .4 is efficient when contracting on q and a = .3 is efficient when contracting on s, the expected benefit from quality measurement increases with decreases in δ 2 from roughly 15 percent of first-best compensation when δ 2 = −.15 to 18 percent of first-best compensation when δ 2 = −.20. When contracting only on q, action a = .2 is efficient for δ 2 sufficiently small, even when action a = .3 is first best. This is because implementing a moderate level of a is very costly when contracting only on q, and because a 3 becomes a less productive action when δ 2 falls (expected r falls, while expected q remains constant). Also, note that for given actions, the structure of the optimal contract is invariant with respect to changes in δ 2 . When contracting only on q this occurs because an increase in δ 2 does not affect the relative probabilities of low and high q. When contracting on s, this occurs because the only binding incentive constraint turns out to be the one for action a 2 with respect to action a 1 . When the incentive constraint for action a 2 with respect to action a 3 is not binding, the parameter δ 2 does not affect implementation costs under action a 2 .
The second three rows of Table 3 correspond to changes in δ 2 for relatively high values of δ 1 and δ 3 . Note that the value of quality measurement (relative to firstbest compensation) is substantially lower for this set of parameter values, ranging between .6 percent and 4 percent of first-best compensation. When a 3 is a relatively productive action, there is little benefit from quality measurement. Also, note that action a = .4 is efficient for δ 2 sufficiently low, even when contracting on s. This occurs because for this set of parameter values, action a = .4 becomes first best.
Though we did not consider the effect of risk aversion in our analytic comparative statics, intuitively one might expect increased risk aversion to make quality measurement more valuable. When there are more signals of the grower's action, the processor can achieve similar incentives with less risk in the compensation schedule. Table 4 confirms this intuition. The value of quality measurement is relatively low when the grower is not very risk averse. Because we do observe quality measurement in some instances, this result provides some degree of support for the hypothesis that sugarbeet growers are risk averse. However, this support is weak since quality measurement can be valuable even when contracting with a risk-neutral grower. None of the comparative statics in Table 2 relied in any way on the growers' degree of risk aversion. 50 .4 .3 .104 .46,.1.04 .51,.75,.82,.86 .70 .4 .3 .136 .34,.92 .39,.63,.70,.74 .90 .4 .3 .165 .28,.85 .32,.56,.63,.67 
Discussion
We have presented a model and formal analysis to demonstrate why one might expect to observe different sets of performance measures used in grower/processor contracts across the various sugarbeet production regions. In short, the expected benefits from quality measurement may be quite low in areas where sugar purity is not a very "informative" signal of unobserved grower actions (Holmström 1979) . Intuitively, this will be the case when sugar purity does not respond much to grower actions, or in other words when growers do not exercise much control over sugar purity. There are a variety factors that can generate this kind of environment. For example, suppose some other input, say irrigation, is complementary with nitrogen in the sense that it increases the expected marginal purity of nitrogen applications.
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In comparing two regions, one irrigated and one nonirrigated, one would then observe that sugar purity is less "responsive" to nitrogen applications on irrigated ground (purity falls by less when nitrogen applications increase). A reasonable test of our hypothesis could then be constructed with observations on the performance measures used in contracts across irrigated and nonirrigated production regions.
Of course, observed production inputs other than irrigation, and region-specific growing conditions, also influence the distribution of quantity and quality outcomes conditional on unobserved grower actions. Nevertheless, in principle one could collect agronomic data across the various production regions to quantify the degree of potential "control" over sugar purity. One relevant metric for this purpose would be the variance of the likelihood ratio for the joint distribution of sugar quantity and quality associated with different levels of nitrogen application (Kim 1995) . One could then see of if such a measure added some explanatory power in a regression of contract choice (the set of performance measures included in a contract) on various exogenous regressors (location, firm type, firm size, etc.). Unfortunately there is no readily available secondary data from which such a measure might be constructed, and carrying out the necessary experimentation (across each of the relevant production regions)
11 Winter (1990) provides evidence that such a complementarity indeed exists.
to generate primary data would be quite costly. Nevertheless, empirical work along these lines represents a potentially productive avenue for future research.
Although we have talked at considerable length about the relative value of quality measurement in sugarbeet contracts, we have said very little about the cost of quality measurement. Since it will normally be the case that sugar purity provides some additional information, relative to total sugar content, the expected benefits of quality measurement will generally be positive. Thus, in order for our argument to have merit, it is important to identify costs associated with conditioning grower payment on quality that may outweigh expected benefits. We can think of at least two sorts of costs. First, quality must be measured, and this takes additional time and resources that can be avoided when quality is not measured. However, anecdotal evidence and conversations with industry participants suggests that in the case of measuring sugar purity these kinds of measurement costs are actually quite low. Second, introducing a second performance measure into grower contracts substantially increases the complexity of the contracts, both in terms of their design and implementation. Contract design requires assessing the distribution of outcomes (conditional on a variety of potential grower actions), which in the case of two signals is of course multivariate. If there are m possible outcomes for sugar content and n possible outcomes for sugar purity, the number of contingent payments that need to be specified increases by a factor of n(m − 1) when comparing a contract conditioned only on q, with a contract conditioned on s. It seems reasonable to expect that processors (and growers) would want to avoid these contract design costs if the expected benefits from improved design were small.
Conclusion
We use principal-agent theory to explain variation in the structure of contracts used in the North American sugarbeet industry. This particular industry is interesting to study because we observe clearly identifiable variation in the set of performance measures used to condition contract payments to growers. Processors in one set of regions use a contract that conditions grower payment on both total sugar production and sugar purity, while in the remaining regions contract payments depend only on total sugar production. We develop a simple model that shows how the observed variation can occur in response to regional differences in the stochastic relationship that governs quantity and quality outcomes conditional on grower actions.
Briefly, growers' use of nitrogen to fertilize their crops is a key input affecting sugar quantity and quality outcomes. More nitrogen tends to increase the total amount of sugar produced on a given plot of land, but also to reduce sugar purity. The efficient use of nitrogen therefore requires managing a tradeoff between total sugar content and sugar purity. When a contract is conditioned only on total sugar production, growers have an incentive to apply large amounts of nitrogen. When payment also depends on sugar purity, some incentive is provided to reduce the amount of nitrogen applied. Thus, intuitively, the benefit from quality (purity) measurement will be low when nitrogen applications do not have a large influence on sugar purity, or in the language of agency theory, when sugar purity is not an informative signal with respect to unobserved grower actions. Thus, if measuring quality is costly (so that it is only carried out when the benefits of doing so are sufficiently high), we would expect to see variation in the use of quality measurement across production regions, if differences in growing conditions alter the informativeness of sugar purity as a signal of performance.
Although we are unable to provide much direct agronomic evidence that such variation indeed exists, our explanation is at least consistent with the observation that the set of performance measures used in contracts varies across production regions, rather than across firms within regions. We also offer a number of suggestions for how one might go about collecting the data needed to test our hypothesis. It is unclear at this point how one could go about testing our hypothesis against the (potentially) competing hypothesis mentioned in our introduction that the observed differences in contract structure can be explained by differences in the organizational structure of processing firms. These two explanations are in no way nested. Nevertheless, attempts to empirically validate either or both explanations represent potential avenues for future research.
